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ISSUES THAT WILL POSSIBLY BE RAISED AT SEPTEMBER 
IMF A? Hi UAL MEETING 
1. The Economic Outloolc 
A big topic of discussion will be the economic outlook* Generally 
speakingp the immediate outlook^ according to the FundD is bleaka with 
stagflation and balance of payments deficits continuing to plague most 
of the world's oil importers. 
a) Growth 
The "tax" of higher oil prices will weigh heavily on the world 
economy,, The Fund sees output in the industrialized countries growing 
by only 1% this year and next (compared to 3 i n 1979) on account 
of inflation,, public policy measures to counter rising price trendap 
and the draim on domestic incomes derived from higher oil prices» In 
1980 there should be absolute declines in product for the U.S. and Great 
Britain» Along with the slower growth rates is a pervasive slowdown in 
productivity growth in many countries which to & large extent can be 
attributed to structural rather than cyclical factors„ The stagflation 
in the industrialized countries hasD of course^ serious implications 
for developing countries because of its direct effect on their growth 
rates and import prices as well as the indirect effects that can arise 
from possible reactive policy measures in the industrialized countriesp 
e-go protectionism. 
b) Inflation 
The Fund has no formal outlook on inflationc but it will undoubtedly 
remain a problem^ notwithstanding the slower pace of world economic 
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activity. It is veil known that the I IT is preoccupied by the world 
inflationary picture and this —alon^ with remedial inflationary 
policies— will be a major topic of discussion, 
c) External positions 
The external picture also has few bright spots. Growth of world 
trade volume is expected to be flat in both 1980 and 1981. Moreover, 
the oil exporters' current account surplus is projected to rise fron 
69 billion dollars in 1979 to 115 billion dollars in 1980; nor is the 
surplus likely to diminish as quickly as it did in the last major 
round of price increases in 1974. The world "tax" on oil consumption 
has its counterpart in deficits for importers, and the industrialized 
countries will see their deficit rise from 10 billion dollars in 1979 
to roughly 50 billion dollars in 1980, white the non-oil developing 
countries will have their deficit rise fror^53 billion dollars in 1979 
to 70 billion dollars in 1980. The industrialized countries deficit, 
on the whole, should prove to be relatively ! manageable since it is 
? 
concentrated in Germany, Italy and Japan where the current account 
positions were relatively strong just priorJ to 1979. The non-oil 
exporting developing countriesj, however, are relatively more burdened by I their deficits, both because of the absolute sire of the deficits as 
well as because financing oust be arranged on top of an already large 
I external debt. Needless to say, there are ̂ fears in the Fund that 
deficits may place strain on the private banking system —which has { 
undertaken most of the recycling— with consequent adverse effects on 
the araounts and terms of credit. Of course, adecuate finance is the 
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key to maintaining growth in the developing countries. Given the 
financing problem,, the Fund now plans to take on a larger role in the 
recycling of surplus oil receipts (see below) . 
2o New Fund Resources for Balance of Payments Assistance 
A major issue will be how the IMF can play a larger role its 
recycling surpluses. Following directives of the Interim Committee in 
Hamburg on April 25„ 19800 the Fund is pursuing a plan to borrow 
additional resources for balance of payments loans. The plan calls for 
the Fund to raise between 7-10 billion dollars over the next 2 .to 3 
years by contracting resources abroad. The idea is to arrange the loans 
directly with the surplus oil producers such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 
Indeed,, in late August the IMF's Managing Director,, Jacques de LarosiereD 
visited these countries in order to arrange financing proposals for 
presentation at the annual sne<atiing later this month. However^ the Gulf 
states proved less than receptive to the plan because of a decision of 
prevent 
the IMF and World Bank J:hattcopld„ir the attendance of the PLO at this 
year"® annual joint meeting-^ Larosiere returned from his trip empty 
handed. If the PLO issue is not settled relatively soonD the IMF 
presumably will have to go directly to the eurocurrency markets to raise 
the new resources. 
In any case^ the new balance of payments loans will0 in effect,, be 
an extension of the existing Supplementary Financing Facility0 which 
means that it will be available only in conjunction with standby agreements, 
involving conditionality and adjustment. The new resources will allow 
members to borrow up to 600% of their quotas0 in comparison with the 
1/ See point (3) of my memo on the World Bank2 of September 12s 1980s •Fir*"?* vnnro /iai-sn' 1 c nri f-Vi-ic? <m fr- i- a 
currcnt limit of 400%. Thanks to reccnt reforms in Fund, the adjustment 
program can now be designed for up to 3 years (as opposed to the 
traditional 1-year program) and repayment of the loans can be over a 
10-year period. 
The IMF will be securing the additional funds at market interest 
rates, end thus will have to charge market interest rates on their 
loans. However, an interest subsidy is contemplated for low income 
countries, say below 600 dollars per capita. The subsidy will be 
4-5 points. It is not clear whether the IMF will seek to have the oil 
producing countries cover the cost of the @ubsidy0 or whether it will 
finance the subsidy out of its own resources, for instance using 
repayments of loans from the Trust Fund. In any event, the subsidy 
issue is important since the current Supplementary Financing Facility 
of the IMF has not been attractive to many members because of interest 
costs that have exceeded 11Z. For this reasoa8 the Group of 24 has 
urged the Fund to include a subsidy account on any new balance of 
payments assistance. Apparently this suggestion will be heeded. 
The expected larger IMF lending capacity is aimed at aiding 
developing countries in their balance of payments finance0 particularly 
those 'which have trouble gaining access to commercial banks. Indeed, 
a larger profile for the Fund is seen as a way to maintain private 
creditors confidence and to keep an adecuate flow of commercial resources 
to LDC oil importers» 
3. Conditionality 
The Group of 24 has urged that any new Fund resources be extended 
with minimum conditionality, Larosiere is, howevers firmly committed to 
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the principle that new resources have strong conditionality nnd be used 
to promote adjustment. Thus conditionality may be an issue raised by 
developing countries in the annual meetings. 
ActuallyD one could argue that the tuew resources will carry less 
conditionality than has traditionally been the case5 the Fund will be 
lending much more resources (600% as opposed to 400% of quotas) with 
longer repayment periods (up to 10 years) and longer adjustment prorrar-s 
(up to 3 years). Undoubtedly this, fact will be stressed by the Fund as 
an answer to those who se®k less conditionality0 
In 1979 the Fund modified its position era conditionality by 
establishing new guidelines for its application« One of the key clauses 
is in paragraph which states that "In helping members to devise 
adjustment programs0 the Fund will pay due regard to the domesticB 
social and political objectivese the economic priorities^ and the 
circumstances of members0 including the causes of their balance of 
payments problems"» It would seem that this concession is in response 
to criticism from the Group of 24D Group of 770 e£c.s that the Fund's 
programs are excessively harshj, overly uniform and fail to take into 
account the development objectives of the countries and the causes of 
their balance of payments problems» 
Whether the criticism is accurate or not0 there could be further 
discussion of conditionality by representatives of developing countries. 
Both the reports of the Brandt Commission and UTJDP/UNCTAD (The Balance 
of Payments Adjustment Process)0 as well as Belgrade Communique of the 
Group of 240 stress the need to distinguish the external and internal 
causes of balance of payments problems. When problems are basically 
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externally induced —e.g. higher oil prices— it would be argued that 
a very "soft" form of conditionally is merited» Alaos these groups 
would like to see the Fund use a more nclectic methodology for tackling 
the adjustment problem, i.e. something broader than the monetary 
approach to the balance of payments. 
Notwithstanding the new guidelines0 the Fund appears not to be 
very enthusiastic about more reforms in this area. For one thing,, 
the monetary approach to the balance of payments is ideologically 
ingrained in most Fund staff,, and it is difficult to alter the 
institution's general vision of adjustment. Moreovere the Fund staff 
argues that its solutions are not uniform and that problems in countries 
are already dealt with on a \ unique case-by-case basis. Also0 even if 
a balance of payments problem is beyond the responsibility of a member, 
it is said that adjustment is required in any case. As far as the period 
of adjustment is concerned, a common staff position is that it can be 
easier to jump into a cold-watered pool than it is to wade in, i.e. 
extended adjustment is not necessarily easier than quick adjustment. 
It would appear8 then0 that the Fund is not too receptive to a 
further softening of conditionality. The issue may enter debate, but 
the Fund staff seem to feel that the present guidelines provide 
sufficient flexibility for their adjustment program. 
Finally, it should be added that proposals„ such as the Group of 
24's calling for the Fund to employ a more pluralistic approach to 
adjustment, would seem to imply that the Fund would become more deeply 
involved in public policy-making. The use of general monetary targets 
allows the Fund to impose adjustment without becoming directly involved 
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in policy making —the targets sire established and it is up to the 
country to meet them however it wishes* If the IMF were to design a 
more "customissad" adjustment program that truly adapted itself to the 
unique situation of each country9 it undoubtedly would have fco take on 
a more pervasive and detailed role in economic management» This may or 
may not be desirable; that is certain is that such a fundamental 
reorientation of the adjustment methodology would take some tine to 
realize. 
4 o Representation and Voting Rights 
The Group of 24 has urged that developing countries gaits more 
representation in the IIÍF. While this issue may be raised againD there 
is no expectation in the Fund that advancements will be made in this 
area. Howevere a seat for China will probably be discussed, and 
apparently there is considerable support in the Fund for such a move. 
5. The SDR 
The Substitution Account appears to be a dead issue at the moment. 
There will be a discussion of reducing the basket valuation of the SDR 
and unifying the baskets for calculation of valuation and interest rates 
—all for the sake of snaking the SDR a more attractive reserve instrument. 
It seems that no more SDR allocations are envisioned in addition to those 
already programmed. The prospects continue to be dim with regard to 
"linking" SDR allocations to development assistance. 
6„ Trust Fund 
This fund was established from the receipts of gold sales to provide 
balance of payments assistance on concessional terms to low income 
countries. The Trust Fund will not expand further since there are no more 
gold sales contemplated. Uowrver, proposals tiny arise to use loan 
repayments to the Trust Fund as finnnce for subsidies on other IMF 
lending. 
7. Compensatory Finance Facility 
The Group of 24 and the Brandt Commission have urged further 
liberalization of this facility. At the moment it can be used only to 
cover proven export shortfalls, vhile developing countries would like 
to see compensation additionally covering import price increases, 
falls in import volume, food shortages,, etc. These proposals apparently 
do not enjoy enough support to expect moves that would alter the present 
makeup of the facility. 
8. Seventh Quota Increase 
The IMF has agreed to increase its quotas as a way to ensure 
adequate resources for balance of payments support. However, as of 
June 30, 1980, only 34% of its members (quota equivalent) have consented 
to the increase. (It needs 75% to become effective). A major reason 
for the poor response is that the U.S. Congress has dragged its feet 
in consenting to the U. S. quota increase. There is a general feeling 
that not much can be done about this until after the U.S. Presidential 
elections. 
9» Cooperation with the World Bank 
With the IMF extending its stabilization programs to 3 years, and 
the World Bank now offering 5-year structural balance of payments 
adjustment loans, there is now considerable overlap in the functions of 
the two organizations. Presumably this requires some coordination. It 
appears that presently there are no formal guidelines in this regard; 
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at the moment coordination appears to be ad_ hoc•> The most recent case 
is Guyanap where the IMF granted a SDR 100 million loan that was 
paralleled by another large World Bank credit designed to tacldLe the 
structural "supply constraint"» In discussing this at the Ftmdg 1 
received the impression that the two organization were in contact with 
each other, but with coordination between them being rather informal 
and not operating under any grand design. The person I talked in the 
Fund seemed to think that this informal approach was best; he did not 
feel that establishing guidelines for cooperation would be useful,, and 
suggested that the nature of future FundA^orld Bank parallel lending 
would be flexibly determined on a case-by-case basis. This same 
individual also felt that guidelines or criteria for formal coordination 
would not be an issue at the annual meeting» One senses that the two 
organizations may be leary of too close a coordination for fear that 
the responet>ilities of one organization will be usurped in whole or 
part by the other. This latter comment of course is of a purely 
speculative nature. 
10. Other Issues 
Given the bleak economic outlook,, developing countries will 
undoubtedly intensify their demands for assistance, from rich countries. 
Aside from the issues already raentionedD subjects that almost certainly 
will be evoked are the poor aid performance of the industrialized 
countries,, protectionists and the need for established guidelines in the 
area of debt rescheduling and relief. There is no indication that the 
rich countries will be very receptive to these proposals. 

